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The allocation of attentional resources to a focal task can influence performance 
on that task, but within-person changes in allocation policy is typically understudied.  
This study investigates the off-task pull of emotional experiences and the competing on-
task pull of goals.  Emotional experience was manipulated using an ostracizing event and 
goals were experimenter-assigned.  The results did not support the off-task pull of 
emotional experiences or the on-task pull of goals.  Implications and directions for future 













INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 It is readily acknowledged that there are many competing demands on attention in 
the workplace, and emotions are one such source of attentional demand. Strong emotional 
experiences, such as a being socially ostracized at work, may increase the difficulty of 
effectively focusing on the task at hand by pulling attention towards the emotional event. 
Conversely, certain characteristics of tasks, such as specific goals, may provide the extra 
“boost” needed to maintain attention and efficiently finish a project. Thus, the 
“attentional pull” of emotions and goals may jointly influence the direction of attentional 
resources within individuals across time (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005). 
This on- or off-task allocation of attentional resources may explain changes in 
performance on attention-demanding tasks. 
 In organizational research, task performance has traditionally been conceptualized 
as a between-person construct, such that Person A is a good performer and Person B is a 
poor performer (McCloy, Campbell, & Cudeck, 1994). However, this “stabilized” 
measure of performance ignores important within-person variability (i.e., before lunch I 
was very productive, but now I’m not). Currently, very little is understood about the 
changes in performance exhibited within a single person over time and how the 
surrounding environment can influence momentary performance. Employees cannot 
maximally perform for a long period of time without detrimental effects (i.e., burnout; 
Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001) and maximum performance may be more desirable 





field of research investigating the momentary fluctuations in performance is 
disappointing. 
The amount of attentional resources dedicated to a task can directly influence 
performance on that task (Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994), 
suggesting that an individual’s performance may vary greatly across time if resources 
change. Certain aspects of the environment, such as an emotional event, may pull 
attention away from a focal task. An emotional reaction may continue to pull attention 
long after the initial event (Beal et al., 2005), and this prolonged off-task attentional pull 
will impede performance on a focal task. Even as emotions pull attention away, projects 
with task attentional pull can redirect attention back to the focal task. The characteristics 
of high attentional pull tasks; such as importance, interest, and relevant goals; may 
impede the off-task attentional pull of emotions and facilitate prolonged focus on the 
task. This increased ability to resist off-task attentional pull can serve to maintain or even 
increase task-related performance.  
In this study, I will investigate the joint effects of emotion and task characteristics 
on attention-mediated performance. In the following sections, I will address (a) the 
episodic nature of attention and performance, (b) the off-task attentional pull of emotions, 
(c) the self-regulation of attention, and (d) the characteristics of task attentional pull. I 
will conclude with a description of the proposed research.  
1.1 Attention and Performance 
 Attention and performance are inherently transient, changing within individuals 
across time. While it is relatively simple to recognize the changing nature of attention 





researchers have historically not appreciated the important variability in performance 
within individuals. Instead, in most I/O research, performance has been “stabilized” and 
aggregated to focus almost exclusively on between-person comparisons, such as Person 
A is a better performer than Person B (McCloy et al., 1994). This aggregation is 
problematic because it ignores the potentially informative changes in performance that 
occur within individuals across time, and instead treats this variability as error.  
 Organizational researchers recognize that performance can vary meaningfully 
within a single person over time (Kane & Lawler, 1979), but tend to deemphasize its 
import. This deemphasis has occurred despite assertions that the within-person variation 
in performance can be as large as the between-person variation (Deadrick, Bennett, & 
Russell, 1997; Fisher & Noble, 2004), although this obviously depends on the nature of 
the task. The lack of research investigating the within-person changes in attention may be 
due to the lack of a theoretical framework for directing research in this area. Beal and 
colleagues (2005) fill this need and suggest that the meaningful variation in performance 
can be explained by shifts in the direction and intensity of attention.  
 Attentional pull is one mechanism that may explain variation in performance 
episodes by impacting the direction and intensity of attention. Specifically, attentional 
pull describes two complementary components of attention: the momentary allocation 
and the self-regulation of attention (Beal et al., 2005). The momentary allocation of 
attention refers to the direction of attention, such as the distinction between on-task and 
off-task focus as outlined by Beal and colleagues (2005). The self-regulation of attention 





critical in understanding variations in performance and are core components in Kanfer 
and Ackerman’s (1989) model of attentional effort.  
The model suggests that attentional resources can be allocated to three different 
activities: off-task activities, on-task activities, or self-regulatory activities (see Figure 1; 
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). The researchers propose that attentional resources are 
limited, so that when a task requires maximal attentional resources, the redirection of 
resources to off-task or self-regulatory activities will necessarily decrease the proportion 
of resources devoted to on-task activities. This reduction of on-task resources may result 
in decreased performance on a maximally demanding task. A critical component of this 
model is the role of self-regulatory activities in directing the allocation of attention. If 
self-regulatory processes are activated, the allocation of attention to on-or off-task 
activities is expected to change in response to individual’s goals. Conversely, if self-
regulatory processes are inefficient, individuals may be unable to effectively manage the 
direction of their attention.  
In the next sections, I will address the allocation of attention as it is pulled off-
task by emotional experiences, the depleting nature of self-regulatory behavior, and the 
allocation of attention as it is pulled on-task by characteristics of the job. 
1.2 Off-Task Attentional Pull of Emotions 
 Tasks compete with other stimuli and events (i.e., distractions, interruptions, and 
mind wandering episodes) to capture and maintain attention. Emotional experiences may 
have the ability to redirect attentional focus by triggering a large amount of cognitive 
activity in response to an emotional event. It is easy to imagine that emotionally charged 






Figure 1. Ability-motivation interactions model for attentional effort (Kanfer & 





attention to the events surrounding the affective experience and away from the task at 
hand. The cognitive activity created by emotional experiences use attentional resources, 
thereby limiting the amount of resources available for performance on a task. Beal and 
colleagues (2005) suggest there are four components of affective experiences that draw 
on attention: appraisal, arousal, rumination, and affect regulation.  
1.2.1 Appraisal  
The first attention capturing component of affective experiences, the appraisal 
process, explains how discrete emotions are generated in response to an event. The 
emotional appraisal process can be broken down in to two components: primary and 
secondary appraisal (Lazarus, 1966). The first component, primary appraisal, assesses the 
event’s relevance to personal goals. Events that are highly relevant to goals are more 
likely to capture attention. Secondary appraisal is a more controlled process whereby 
individuals assess their ability to cope with the event. As emotional experiences are best 
considered as an outcome of a process, the same event can be reappraised repeatedly, 
changing the emotional experience over time.  
 The appraisal process concerns emotion generation, and should therefore be 
relevant when an emotional event occurs during a focal task. The primary appraisal 
process is thought to be largely automatic, suggesting that it will not have a large impact 
on performance on a focal task beyond the momentary demands on attentional resources. 
Secondary appraisal, however, is a much more elaborate process and is where most of the 
cognitive “work” occurs. While the primary appraisal process simply directs attention to 
an event, the secondary appraisal process evaluates the individual’s ability to manage the 





specifically suggests that the secondary appraisal process is an evaluation of the 
characteristics of the event and personal resources to determine an appropriate response 
to the event, such as dedicating more resources to attaining the thwarted goal or giving up 
that goal altogether. As discussed above, secondary appraisal may occur iteratively over 
time, and therefore may continue to redirect attention and draw on attentional resources 
even after the event took place.  
1.2.2 Arousal  
Arousal is best considered on a continuum ranging from one extreme of sleep and 
drowsiness to the other extreme of frenetic excitement and can be described as “one’s 
sense of mobilization and energy” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). Models of attentional 
resources (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) suggest that arousal levels influence the amount of 
attentional resources available for use, such that maximum attention allocation towards a 
task is only possible during moderate levels of arousal. 
Hancock (1986) reviewed the role of thermal stress on behavioral arousal and 
attentional resources. He proposed three mechanisms that explain changes in 
performance on a vigilance task based on thermal stress: physiological adequacy, 
behavioral arousal, and attention resource capacity. Physiological adequacy suggests that 
measurements of body temperature indicate individual’s physiological state. Changes in 
deep body temperature impact behavioral arousal and can occur in four distinctive 
patterns. First, an initial introduction in to a warm, mildly uncomfortable environment 
increases physiological arousal and subsequently increases attentional control. The slow 
increase in body temperature consistent with remaining in the warm ambient environment 





abrupt change to body temperature corresponds to increased arousal and improved 
attentional control. Finally, as temperature approaches intolerable levels and 
physiological arousal increases to abnormally high levels, maintenance of attention 
becomes improbable. This illustrates the curvilinear relationship between arousal and 
attentional control. As arousal increases from low to moderate levels, attentional control 
improves. However, very high levels of arousal result in problematic attentional control. 
The relationship between attention and arousal can be best explained if attention 
is viewed as a limited resource, as proposed by Kanfer and Ackerman (1989). Hancock 
(1970) and others equate uncontrollable changes in deep body temperature with stress, 
and suggests that stress draws on the limited pool of attentional resources. However, this 
approach does not explain why low levels of physiological arousal correspond to reduced 
attentional control. If arousal moderates the pool of attentional resources available, as 
proposed by Kanfer and Ackerman (1989), then the effect of low arousal on attentional 
control can be explained. Low levels of arousal that characterizes states such as 
sleepiness may decrease the pool of resources available. Similarly, high levels of arousal 
may create stress, which draws on the pool of resources available. Therefore, low and 
high levels of arousal decrease the pool of attentional resources available, thereby 
limiting the amount of resources that can be dedicated to a task and potentially negatively 
impacting performance on a demanding task. However, performance might not be 
impacted on a task with low attentional demands, as sufficient resources may still be 
available for successful completion. The maximum level of attentional resources are 





 In addition to influencing the amount of attentional resources available, high 
arousal may also limit the breadth of cues processed. Easterbrook (1959) suggests that 
arousal will “reduce the range of cues an organism is using” (p. 183) and focus attention 
on the arousing stimuli. Supporting this hypothesis, Christianson and Loftus (1991) found 
that participants exhibited improved recall of details related to an instigating stimulus. 
Participants were presented a slideshow with a “critical” slide depicting an emotional, 
neutral, or unusual event. The results indicate that participants were better able to recall 
details central to the critical event in the emotional compared to control condition, but 
exhibited poorer recall on peripheral details. This differential performance exhibits the 
narrowing of attentional focus on the instigating stimulus and highlights the potential 
differential effects of arousal on performance. The focusing of attention may improve 
task performance if the task demands narrow focus, but overly focused attention may also 
impair performance. 
Finucane (2011) found that the arousing emotional states, induced by a fear and 
anger manipulation, impact performance on an unrelated flanker task by reducing the 
range of cues processed. In the flanker task, participants must respond to a central target 
while ignoring simultaneously presented distracting information. Aroused individuals 
were able to better inhibit the irrelevant stimuli and exhibited enhanced selective 
attention on the central target, suggesting that arousal may enhance selective attention on 
an unrelated task in addition to the instigating stimulus. 
If performance requires focused processing of the central event, arousal may 





& Ackerman, 1989). However, if performance requires broad processing of the 
environment, the narrowing of focus resulting from increased arousal may be detrimental.  
1.2.3 Rumination  
A third component of affective experiences is rumination, or thoughts that revolve 
around a common theme and recur in the absence of environmental demands on thought 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996). People tend to ruminate about their emotions, and this 
rumination requires cognitive activity that may divert attentional resources long after the 
event occurred. Rumination can therefore be considered as a lingering reaction to an 
emotional event or part of a continued reappraisal process.  
Martin and Tesser (1996) suggest that rumination is goal-directed and negative 
rumination often occurs in response to a thwarted goal (p. 10).  The importance of 
thwarted goals in rumination is evidenced by Lavallee and Campbell’s (1995) study that 
suggests students report higher levels of rumination and negative affect when negative 
events are goal-relevant instead of goal-irrelevant. Jones, Papadakis, Orr, and Strauman 
(2013) extended the literature by investigating the effect of goal failure on subsequent 
rumination. They found that participants who were primed with promotion (i.e., 
advancement and growth opportunities) and prevention (i.e., safety and security) goal 
failures engaged in higher levels of rumination (Jones et al., 2013, p. 499). Furthermore, 
participants’ who self-reported a tendency to experience negative emotion in conjunction 
with rumination exhibited increased levels of negative affect over a five-minute period, 
suggesting a reciprocal relationship between rumination and negative affect. Jones and 





rumination predicts negative affect. These studies suggest that rumination often occurs 
concomitantly with negative affect. 
 Goal appraisals and subsequent rumination also play an important role in the 
workplace. Wang and colleagues (2013) investigated the role of rumination with service 
employees. The researchers found that employees exposed to higher levels of customer 
mistreatment during a workday reported higher levels of rumination that night and higher 
negative mood the next morning compared to individuals exposed to low levels of 
customer mistreatment. This study exhibits the important role rumination may play in the 
workplace and the potential negative effects that linger long after the original event.  
 The pervasive, repetitive, and uncontrollable nature of rumination, in conjunction 
with continued appraisal processes, suggests that attentional resources may be diverted 
for an extended period of time after the event occurs.  
1.2.4 Cognitive Requirements of Affect Regulation  
Finally, emotional regulation may exert attentional pull long after the initial 
emotional event. Emotional regulation is the process by which “individuals influence 
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express 
these emotions” (Gross, 1998, p. 275) and requires substantial amounds of cognitive 
activity to be effective. The direction of attention, evaluation of an emotional event, and 
behavioral responses can be impacted by emotion regulation strategies.  
 The direction of attention in response to an event, termed attentional deployment 
by Gross (1998), can be impacted by three strategies: distraction, concentration, and 
rumination. Distraction focuses attention on the non-emotional aspects of the event or 





disengaging from goals. Concentration, on the other hand, involves focusing cognitive 
resources thoroughly in to a task to the exclusion of distractors. Finally, rumination refers 
to focusing attention on emotions and their consequences. The strategy engaged by an 
individual will determine the direction of their attention.  
 After the attentional focus has been determined, an evaluation occurs that imbues 
the event with meaning and determines an individual’s capacity to manage a situation 
(Gross, 1998, p. 284), similar to emotional appraisal. One mechanism of evaluating the 
event is reappraisal, or “cognitively transforming the situation so as to alter its emotional 
impact” (Gross, 1998, p. 284). Reappraisal is an antecedent-focused strategy of emotional 
regulation, meaning that it occurs quickly after an emotional event and impacts the 
experiential and behavioral components of negative emotion (Gross & John, 2003). 
Finally, emotion regulation strategies can influence the “physiological, experiential, or 
behavioral responding” (Gross, 1998, p. 285). Suppression is a typical response-focused 
regulation strategy that attempts to regulate the behavioral expressions in response to an 
emotion event (Gross & John, 2003).   
 Gross and John (2003) found that reappraisers experienced less negative emotion 
while suppressors experienced more negative emotion, suggesting that the different 
regulation strategies can differentially impact emotional experience. Ortner, Zelazo, and 
Anderson (2013) explicitly tested the attentional demands of these regulation strategies 
and found that reaction times on an auditory discrimination task in reappraisal and 
suppression conditions were slower than the control condition. The researchers suggest 
that reappraising or suppressing emotions demands attentional resources above and 





attentional resources and, in demanding situations, attentional impairment, even though 
the subsequent emotional experiences are distinctly different.   
 Grandey’s (2003) work on emotion regulation in the workplace provides evidence 
that emotional regulation strategies can alter individual’s emotional experience. She 
found that employees who regulated their emotional expression using surface acting, or 
only modifying the behavioral display of emotions without regulating inner feelings, was 
related to increased emotional exhaustion. Interestingly, deep acting, or regulating inner 
feelings to match outward displays, was not related to emotional exhaustion after 
removing the effects of surface acting. These disparate emotional experiences illustrate 
the differential effects of emotion regulation strategies.  
The mechanisms of rumination and emotional regulation are the two critical 
processes for explaining the attentional pull of emotions. These mechanisms involve 
extensive cognitive “work,” particularly emotional regulation which involves evaluating 
an emotional event and altering behavioral responses accordingly. Furthermore, 
rumination and emotional regulation can be considered lingering responses to an 
emotional event that continue to draw upon attentional resources long after the event 
occurred. This suggests that emotions can exert attentional pull, through the mechanisms 
of rumination and emotional regulation, for a nontrivial amount of time after the initial 
event.  
1.3 Self-Regulation of Attention and Depletion 
 Resisting the off-task attentional pull of emotions and redirecting attentional 
resources on-task requires self-regulation. Effective self-regulation requires sufficient 





required for acts of self-control or exertion. When sufficient regulatory capacity is not 
available to meet the existing demands on resources, the individual’s ability to manage 
their behavior or attention efficiently may suffer. As described by Kanfer and Ackerman 
(1989), self-regulatory activities are responsible for changing the allocation of attentional 
resources as needed. However, when an individual’s ability to self-regulate is depleted, 
they may be unable to inhibit off-task distractors, such as emotional experiences, and 
efficiently regulate the direction of attention.  
Muraven and Baumeister’s (2000) theory of self-control may shed some light on 
the role regulatory resources play in managing emotions, attention, and subsequent 
behavior. They suggest that self-regulation is “the attempt to control or alter one’s own 
responses” (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998, p. 774). They further propose a strength 
model that suggests prolonged self-regulation results in depletion of regulatory resources 
and, consequently, an impaired ability to manage behavior. Their strength model of self-
regulation is, at its core, based on five key assumptions. First, Muraven and Baumeister 
(2000) suggest that “self-control is necessary for the executive component of the self (i.e., 
the aspect of the self that makes decisions, initiates and interrupts behavior, and 
otherwise exerts control) to function” (p. 248). Second, self-control is a limited resource 
that gets depleted with use. Third, all acts of self-control draw on the same underlying 
resource. Fourth, the ability to successfully complete acts of self-control depends on the 
individual’s “level of self-control strength” (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000, p. 248). 
Finally, when an individual engages in acts of self-control, self-control strength is 





This model suggests that if individuals are depleted of their regulatory resources 
they may find it more difficult to inhibit the alluring attentional pull of emotions and the 
direction of their attentional resources may be pulled off-task. Therefore, the amount of 
resources available may be critically important for investigating the influence of the off-
task attentional pull of emotions. If sufficient resources are available, an individual may 
be able to maintain sufficient task focus while managing the off-task demands of 
emotions, thereby maintaining high levels of performance on a focal task. If sufficient 
resources are unavailable, then emotions should pull attention off-task at the expense of 
continued high performance.  
1.4 Characteristics of Task Attentional Pull 
 When emotions are drawing attention off-task and regulatory resources are 
depleted, maintaining task-focused attention may be particularly difficult. However, 
certain characteristics of the task itself may exhibit attentional pull and be able to 
overcome the off-task pull of emotions. These characteristics may draw attention to and 
maintain attention on a particular task without requiring active self-regulation (Beal et al., 
2005). In this section, I will specifically investigate the role of task importance, task 
interest, and task-relevant goals in directing attention.  
1.4.1 Task importance 
Important tasks may be less susceptible to the off-task attentional pull of 
distractions of emotions. Unfortunately, the literature of task importance and attention is 
not as pronounced as the literature on performance. Therefore, I will report studies that 






 Some have attempted to bridge the gap between attention and performance by 
embedding their research within Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) model of attentional 
effort. According to this, distal motivation processes impact intended task effort, or the 
proportion of attentional resources allocated to the task. When a task is perceived as 
important, these distal processes should increase intended task effort and improve 
subsequent performance by dedicating more attentional resources to the task. Conversely, 
individuals should dedicated fewer attentional resources to unimportant tasks and, if the 
task is resource-dependent, subsequently exhibit decreased performance. Seijts, 
Meertens, and Kok (1997) found that, in accordance with the framework, task importance 
moderates the relationship between goals and performance. Specifically, when 
participants were exposed to very high goals for a perceived unimportant task, 
performance decreased. This decrease likely occurred because the distal processes 
deemed that the continuous effort and persistence needed for high performance was 
unnecessary for an unimportant task, therefore resulting in fewer attentional resources 
being allocated to the task. Conversely, very high goals for an important task resulted in 
increased performance, suggesting that increased attentional resources were allocated to 
the task and illustrating the attentional pull of importance.  
Other researchers investigated the impact of importance on resource dependent 
and resource independent stimuli. Participants were asked to respond to event-based (i.e., 
when an external reminder is presented) or time-based (i.e., every 10 minutes with no 
external reminder) probes while simultaneously completing a demanding background 
task (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001). The event-based probes are resource 





The time-based probes are resource dependent; participants must devote attentional 
resources to monitoring the probe in order to respond appropriately, thereby redirecting 
resources away from the background task. The results suggest that important tasks pull 
attention when they are resource dependent. Performance on the background task showed 
no change when the probes were event-based, presumably because the probes did not 
demand attentional resources. Conversely, performance on the background task 
decreased immediately before and after target times for the important time-based probes 
compared to the unimportant time-based probes. The researchers suggest this decrease in 
performance is due to increased allocation of attentional resources to the important probe, 
which resulted in a necessary decrease in the proportion of resources dedicated to the 
demanding background task. This differential treatment of important and unimportant 
probes exhibits the attentional pull of important, resource dependent tasks.  
1.4.2 Task interest 
Interesting tasks may pull attention independent of the task’s importance. Once 
again, the literature on task interest and attention is not as extensive as the literature on 
performance. Therefore, studies that approximate the interest-attention relationship, but 
do not directly measure attention, are included.  
Silvia (2001) suggests that “texts can contain interesting elements and important 
elements; interesting elements need not be important, however” (p. 277). In a study 
comparing the recall of interesting and important information, researchers found that 
interesting information was much more likely to be remembered than important 
information (Wade & Adams, 1990). These results suggest that task interest may exert 





 The influence of task interestingness on performance is broad. Meta-analytic 
results suggest that interest is correlated with academic achievement (r = .27; Schiefele, 
Krapp, & Winteler, 1992). Others suggest that task interest is related to performance on 
lab tasks (r = .39) and accounts for unique variance beyond the demands of the task 
(Eveleth & Pillutla, 2003). Fisher and Noble’s (2004) experience sampling study using 
employees found that task interest had an effect on performance beyond that due to its 
contribution to effort. While these studies did not explicitly explore the role of attention, 
these results could be interpreted as evidence that task interest not only directs attention 
to a task, but does so without using regulatory resources. The indication that task interest 
accounts for more variance in performance than task demands or effort expended 
suggests that participants automatically and effortlessly allocate more attentional 
resources to the on-task demands. 
 Similar to the findings addressed above, numerous researchers propose that task 
interest lessens the regulatory burden for directing attention. Hidi (2000) suggests that 
when interest is high, “focusing attention and continuing cognitive engagement… feel 
relatively effortless” (p. 311). Interesting tasks may even lessen regulatory burden by 
making it easier to block intrusive thoughts or distractions (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 
1996; Silvia, 2001). Despite the breadth of theory linking task interest and attention, there 
does not appear to any research directly assessing this relationship.  
1.4.3 Task-Relevant Goals 
The core explanatory mechanisms in interest (i.e., increased engagement and 
attention) are also central to goal setting theory. Goals, as defined by Locke and Latham 





intention, task, deadline, purpose, aim, end, and objective” (p. 2). Three mechanisms are 
proposed that explain the effect of goals on action or performance: effort, persistence, 
and direction of attention (Locke & Latham, 1990).  
Intensity of effort is thought to increase when individuals are assigned difficult 
goals. For example, tasks with high demands require a larger proportion of attentional 
resources, and therefore more intense effort, than tasks with low demands. Kahneman 
(1973) suggests effort can be conceptualized as the amount of attentional resources 
assigned to a task, such that increased effort corresponds to increased allocation of 
attentional resources. Research has investigated the effect of difficult goals on physical 
effort, rate of work, subjective effort ratings of the participants, effort inferences made by 
third parties, and physiological indicators of effort (see Locke & Latham, 1990, for a 
review). The breadth of methods and number of studies that indicate goals impact effort 
led Locke and Latham (1990) to suggest that the “inescapable conclusion that goals affect 
performance” is due in part to “their effects on intensity of effort” (p. 89).  
 The second mechanism, persistence, is effort maintained over time and is 
typically measured as time spent on an activity. The duration of effort is independent of 
the intensity of effort; it is possible to persist at a low effort activity for hours or engage 
in high-effort behavior for only a few minutes. Research indicates that individuals with 
hard goals spend more time on a task, whether it is a prose learning task (LaPorte & 
Nath, 1976), an anagram task (Sales, 1970), time spent exercising (Kirsch, 1978), or a 
physical endurance task (Hall, Weinberg, & Jackson, 1987; Stevenson, Kanfer, & 





 Finally, goals serve to direct attention to goal-relevant activities and to activate 
stored knowledge and skills that are relevant to the goal (Locke & Latham, 1990). The 
majority of studies investigating the directive effects of goals are prose learning studies, 
and they indicate that students learn more about goal-relevant material than goal-
irrelevant material (Rothkopf & Billington, 1975; Rothkopf & Kaplan, 1972). Other 
studies suggest that when multiple measures of performance exist, only goal-relevant 
criteria exhibited improvements while goal-irrelevant criteria were unchanged (Locke & 
Bryan, 1969; Terborg, 1976).  
 Overall, goals have been shown to decrease the variability in and increase the 
general levels of performance by influencing the intensity, duration, and direction of 
attention. Research indicates that specific and difficult goals are particularly adept at 
redirecting attention to goal-relevant stimuli. 
1.4.3.1 Influence of Specific and Difficult Goals  
A productive area of research within goal setting theory investigates the 
difference between qualitatively different goals, such as the difference between specific 
goals with an associated standard of performance and vague goals such as “do your best.” 
A difficult and specific goal and a “do your best” goal both imply a high standard of 
performance, but that standard is communicated in qualitatively different ways. The 
pairing of specific and difficult goals is almost ubiquitous in the research for theoretical 
reasons. Locke and Latham (1990) suggest that it would be “relatively trivial” to compare 
the effects of specific moderate or easy goals with “work at a moderate pace” or “work at 
a slow pace” qualitative goals (p. 29). Therefore, the majority of the literature comparing 





goals with high difficulty and qualitative goals with “do your best” instructions. In line 
with previous research, I will investigate the joint influence of specific and difficult 
goals.  
Similar to task interest and importance, few studies directly assess the role of 
goals in directing attention, but instead assume changes in attention based on 
performance. As directing attention is a core proposed mechanism for explaining the 
influence of goals, the studies reported approximate changes in attention by reporting 
changes in performance. 
Research suggests that individuals with specific and difficult goals exhibit higher 
levels of performance on a variety of tasks than individuals with vague, qualitative goals 
such as “do your best.” An original primary study by Locke and Bryan (1966) 
investigated the role of specific and difficult goals on performance of a complex 
coordination task. The results indicate that even though participants successfully 
achieved their goals on only 29% of trials, participants with specific goals almost 
immediately exhibited higher performance levels than those in the “do your best” 
condition.  
Hundreds of studies followed this initial investigation, which have been 
summarized in a variety of meta-analyses. Five meta-analyses conducted in the 1980s 
(Chidester & Grigsby, 1984; Hunter & Schmidt, 1983; Mento et al., 1987; Tubbs, 1986; 
Wood et al., 1987) found effect size estimates ranging from .42 to .80, suggesting that 
difficult and specific goals produce tangible improvements in performance compared to 
“do your best” or no goals. In a more recent review, Day and Unsworth (2013) claim that 





over 100 different tasks across more than 40,000 participants with time spans ranging 
from 1 minute to 25 years” (p. 160). These results and assertions suggest that specific and 
difficult goals may reliably and robustly pull attention to the focal task, thereby 
enhancing performance.  
The robust improvement in performance related to specific and difficult goals 
compared to “do your best” goals may be due to the ambiguity of qualitative goals. When 
participants are told to “do their best,” any range of performance outcomes may be 
compatible with the goal. However, a specific and difficult goal is very clear cut. Only 
attaining a specific level of performance is considered successfully achieving the goal. 
Kernan and Lord (1989) suggested that participants without specific goals typically 
evaluated their performance more positively than participants with specific and difficult 
goals. This finding could be due to the range of responses that satisfy qualitative goals.  
This evidence suggests that specific and difficult goals typically have a robust 
impact on performance of a focal task, as suggested by Locke and Latham (1990), by 
pulling attention to the task by influencing the effort, persistence, and direction of 
attention. Despite the breadth of research indicating the utility of specific and difficult 
goals, they are not always advantageous. Boundary conditions exist that limit the 
effectiveness of specific and difficult goals on certain tasks.  
1.4.3.2 Deleterious Effects of Specific and Difficult Goals  
Research suggests that specific goals may not uniformly improve performance. 
Specific and difficult goals may actually impede performance on complex and novel 
tasks. Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) found evidence that performance was impeded on a 





goals compared to “do your best” goals. They suggest the additional self-regulatory 
demands that accompany specific and challenging goals may hinder performance by 
taking away needed resources from the focal task. Interestingly, as participants learned 
the rules for the task and the resource demands declined, specific and challenging goals 
once again began to improve task performance.  
A similar effect was found in a study on goal conditions and practice conditions 
(Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994). A massed practice condition was 
thought to require higher levels of regulatory resources as performance must be sustained 
over time, while spaced practice poses less of a burden because of rest intervals that do 
not require regulatory resources. In line with previous research, participants in the massed 
practice condition were hurt by specific and difficult goals, but participants in the spaced 
practice conditions benefited. Specific and difficult goals hurt performance when 
participants’ regulatory resources were already severely taxed. 
The above results illustrate the utility of specific and difficult goals as well as 
outline the boundary conditions for effective use. These results suggest that, when using a 
relatively simple task, specific and difficult goals will pull attention to the focal task and 
enhance performance.  
 Despite the lack of direct evidence of the effects of goals on attention, specific 
and difficult goals will be used to investigate the role of task attentional pull in this study. 
This specific mechanism was chosen above task interest and importance for several 
reasons. First, goal setting literature proposes that goals redirect attention, and this study 
will allow us to more precisely assess that mechanism. Second, goal setting literature also 





the proportion of attentional resources assigned to a specific task. The goal setting 
mechanism, persistence, is defined as effort over time. This suggests that the effects of 
goals on effort and persistence may be manifested in changes in the allocation and 
regulation of attentional resources.  
1.5 Summary 
 As discussed above, high levels of task performance requires focused attention on 
that task. Tasks compete with other stimuli and events for attention. Emotions demand 
attention through multiple processes, notably rumination and emotional regulation, and 
therefore can impede performance. Rumination and emotional regulation generate 
extensive amounts of cognitive activity, and this activity can continue long after the 
initial emotional event has occurred. This suggests that emotions can continue to pull 
attention even after the initial event. 
 People can respond to the off-task pull of emotions by regulating their attention 
and therefore maintaining their performance. However, this regulation requires sufficient 
regulatory resources, which can become depleted after extended use. When individuals 
are depleted, they will be less able to effectively regulate their attention. However, certain 
characteristics of tasks can exert attentional pull, thereby overcoming the need for 
regulation. Even when individuals are depleted of their regulatory resources, tasks with 
high attentional pull (i.e., tasks with specific and difficult goals) may be able to pull 
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 Attention can be pulled in multiple directions at a given time. As described above, 
emotions can exert off-task attentional pull and certain characteristics of an assignment 
can elicit on-task attentional pull. In this study, I investigated the effects of the off-task 
attentional pull of emotions, as elicited by an ostracizing experience, and the on-task 
attentional pull of specific and difficult goals. Prior to completion of the full study, two 
pilot studies were conducted to determine (a) that ostracism does elicit an emotional 
response and (b) that the task used for this study, the Sustained Attention to Response 
Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), is susceptible to 
attentional pull.   
2.1 Ostracism and Emotions 
As I have argued above, emotional episodes can pull attention away from a focal 
task. At work, many kinds of events can elicit distracting emotional reactions. In this 
study, I focused on one: ostracism. Ostracism is best characterized by ignoring, 
excluding, or rejecting others (Williams, 2001), and is a common occurrence in society 
and organizations. In a study with over 2,000 participants, 67% reported using the “silent 
treatment” to chastise a loved one and 75% reported being the recipient of the “silent 
treatment” (Faulkner, Williams, Sherman, & Williams, 1997). Ostracism is also 
commonly used in organizations after “whistleblowers” report organizational misconduct 





In addition to being common, ostracism is also a powerful emotion-eliciting 
experience. In Williams’ (2001) basic model of ostracism, he suggests that immediate 
reactions to ostracism may be “hurt feelings, anger, damaged mood, and physiological 
arousal” (p. 64).  
 Intuition suggests that exclusion will elicit an emotional reaction from 
individuals. For many individuals, it is easy to recall a time when they were excluded and 
the subsequent frustration, confusion, sadness, or anger. However, the empirical studies 
show mixed results. In this section, I will describe studies that found strong evidence for 
the impact of ostracism on emotion and studies that did not find this relationship. 
Furthermore, I will attempt to explain why the studies finding no relationship may be a 
poor assessment of emotional reactions.  
2.1.1 Ostracism does Elicit Emotion 
A breadth of research suggests that ostracism does cause self-reported distress, as 
measured by “mood…, hurt feelings, levels of belonging, self-esteem, control, 
meaningful existence, and more direct measures of distress or pain” (Williams, 2007, p. 
434). Meta-analytics results corroborate Williams’ (2007) assertion that there is “ample 
evidence” of the relationship between ostracism and emotions (p. 434). Specifically, 
meta-analytic results suggest that a moderate effect exists between ostracism and emotion 
(d = -0.50; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). The authors also coded for mood scale and found 
that items developed by the researcher evidenced the largest effect between ostracism and 
mood (d = -0.66), followed by the PANAS/PANAS-X (d = -0.34; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), Heatherton Sensation Questionnaire (d = -0.28, n.s.; Heatherton, Striepe, 





 Gerber and Wheeler (2009) also found a relationship between ostracism and 
positive/negative mood scales. Specifically, they found that ostracism was related to 
negative emotion (d = 0.33), such that ostracized individuals reported increased negative 
mood. Ostracism was also related to positive emotion (d = -0.48), such that ostracized 
individuals reported decreased positive mood. Despite the small number of studies 
included in these estimates (k ≤ 15), they provide preliminary evidence that exclusion 
does indeed evoke an emotional reaction.  
 A variety of studies support the meta-analytic results described above. Notably, 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams (2003) found that the same neural pathways 
activated in physical pain were also involved in the experience of social separation or 
rejection. Other researchers found that, even when exclusion was financially beneficial, 
individuals still reportedly felt worse when ostracized (van Beest & Williams, 2006). 
These studies suggest that ostracism is a basic and powerful experience that produces 
negative reactions even when exclusion is desirable, suggesting that reactions to 
ostracism may be automatic.  
2.1.2 Ostracism Does Not Elicit Emotion 
In contrast, some researchers suggest that individuals do not experience emotional 
responses after ostracizing experiences (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Specifically, 
individuals respond to exclusion with “emotional numbing, reduced empathy, cognitive 
inflexibility, lethargy, and an absence of meaningful thought” (Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 
p. 108). This “cold” response to ostracism was found in multiple studies conducted by 





Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, and Twenge (2005) conducted six studies that 
measured the impact of ostracism on self-regulatory failure, and the mediating role of 
emotions. Across these six studies, the researchers concluded that ostracism does not 
elicit an emotional reaction and emotions do not mediate the relationship between 
ostracism and self-regulatory failure. However, a number of methodological errors may 
have obscured the potential true relationship between ostracism and emotion. Across the 
studies, the number of participants in each condition ranged from 10 to a maximum of 19 
participants per condition. Based on the number of conditions and participants per cell, 
the reported studies’ power ranged from .20 to .32 for a medium effect size (f = .25), 
exhibiting substantially low power. Even if a large effect size was estimated in the power 
analysis (f = .40), the power ranged from .44 to .70, which is still below the widely 
recommended cutoff of .80 for power in psychological studies. Despite these power 
issues, one study did find a significant effect of ostracism on emotion valence using 
planned comparisons with a sample of 17 participants per condition (Baumeister et al., 
2005, p. 598). However, the researchers suggest that as mood did not mediate the 
relationship between ostracism and self-regulatory failure, the effect is uninteresting.  
Furthermore, the measures of emotional response may not have been appropriate. 
Two of the six studies had participants respond to a single item rating their mood from 
“very negative” (1) to “very positive” (7). The remaining four studies measured 
emotional response using the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 
1988). Use of the BMIS may be particularly problematic for several reasons. The items 
used to measure mood do not make practical sense as a reaction to ostracism. Specifically 





Gaschke, 1988, p. 103). It is unclear, practically and theoretically, how ostracism is 
supposed to impact a number of the items contained in this scale. Furthermore, the 
authors point out that the arousal subscale is insufficiently reliable (Mayer & Gaschke, 
1988, p. 105).  
After considering these potential limitations in Baumeister et al. (2005)’s studies, 
we may conclude that they were unable to provide an adequate test of the relationship 
between ostracism and emotion. Problems with the quality of the ostracism manipulation, 
sample size, and measurement of emotion may have obscured the relationship.  
Despite these limitations, it is important to consider the possibility that ostracism 
experiences do not elicit emotional responses. If emotions do not mediate the relationship 
between ostracism and self-regulatory failure, as suggested, then Baumeister et al. (2005) 
propose three potential mediating mechanisms: increased arousal, rumination, and using 
cognitive resources to regulate emotional distress. These three “non-emotional” 
mechanisms match exactly the emotion attentional pull mechanisms proposed by Beal et 
al. (2005), suggesting that even if individuals inhibit emotional responses to ostracism, 
the ostracizing experience will still exert attentional pull. The resemblance between these 
mechanisms coupled with the questionable assessment of emotion suggests that the lack 
of significant findings may be due to study design, not because the phenomenon does not 
actually exist.  
2.1.3 Ostracism and Attentional Pull 
A variety of researchers using a variety of measures, manipulations, and methods 
found evidence supporting the claim that exclusion elicits an emotional reaction. Even 





indicates that ostracism affects the same processes that are hypothesized to be at work in 
emotion attention pull. Specifically, there are parallels in the ostracism literature that 
match the processes of emotion appraisal, arousal, rumination, and impaired self-
regulation.  
 Reactions to exclusion mirror the primary and secondary appraisal processes 
described in the emotions literature. The reflexive pain response to ostracism mirrors 
primary appraisal and is thought to be automatic or precognitive response (van Beest & 
Williams, 2006), while the process of “cognitively and affectively cop(ing)… unabated 
by distracting tasks” (Williams, 2009, p. 294) to recover from the exclusion experience 
mirrors secondary appraisal. Ostracism also increases arousal as indicated by observed 
behavior (Boyes & French, 2009) and skin conductance levels (Kelly, McDonald, & 
Rushby, 2012). Ruminating on an ostracizing experience has also been shown to prolong 
negative affect (Lau, Moulds, & Richardson, 2009). Finally, Baumeister et al. (2005) 
suggest that participants may engage in emotional regulation in an attempt to decrease 
experienced distress and showed that ostracism impaired self-regulation on a number of 
tasks (i.e., amount of bad tasting drink consumed, number of cookies consumed, 
persistence on an unsolvable puzzle, and performance on a dichotic listening task).  
The strong evidence provided here, combined with the questionable evidence 
contradicting the ostracism-emotion link, suggests that exclusion will cause an emotional 
response in participants as predicted in Williams’ (2009) Temporal Need-Threat theory. 
Due to the conflicting positions on ostracism and emotions, a pilot study was conducted 





2.2 Pilot Study of Ostracism and Emotions 
Twenty-seven undergraduate students participated in the study for compensation. 
Participants played a computer-based ball-tossing game (Cyberball; Williams & Jarvis, 
2006) which required participants to virtually interact with two other “students.” This 
ostracism manipulation is the most commonly used experimental manipulation, and the 
procedures used in this study exactly mimic previous ostracism studies.  For the pilot 
study, twelve individuals were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were 
ostracized (ostracism condition), while the remaining fifteen individuals were assigned to 
a condition in which they were included (inclusion condition).  
2.2.1 Pilot Cover Story 
As this study was attempting to elicit emotions from participants, a convincing 
cover story was needed to prevent participants from becoming disengaged from the study 
and render our manipulations ineffective. Therefore, participants were told that they were 
participating in a study investigating the effects of mental visualization on work tasks. In 
actuality, the study investigated the impact of inclusion/exclusion in the Cyberball task 
and subsequent affect.  This cover story is identical to the cover story used by the original 
developers of the Cyberball task (Williams & Jarvis, 2006) and subsequent researchers.   
2.2.2 Pilot Procedure 
Instead of revealing the true nature of the study, participants were told they were 
participating in a study on mental visualization. Participants were initially asked to 
complete the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) to strengthen this 





“students” connecting remotely from two other local universities, in congruence with 
standard Cyberball procedure.  
  After completing the ball-tossing task, participants were asked to fill out the 
Reflexive and Reflective Questionnaire to assess participant’s emotional responses 
(Williams, 2009). The reflexive questionnaire asks participants to report on feelings 
experienced during the game, and the reflective questionnaire asks participants to report 
on feelings experienced right now. The stems used on these scales to differentiate 
between reflexive and reflective emotional responses are taken verbatim from the original 
scale.  Despite the different time frames, both questionnaires were administered 
immediately following the Cyberball task. As the study concluded after that survey, it 
was not possible to separate the two measures in time for the pilot. However, the 
reflective and reflexive scales were temporally separated for the full study.  
In order to maintain our cover story, participants were asked (a) how vividly they 
imagined the task, (b) how much they enjoyed the other players, (c) how much they 
would like to meet the other players in person, and (d) how often they engage in different 
types of virtual interactions. The above four questions were not be used in the analyses.  
2.2.3 Manipulation of Ostracism 
Cyberball was used to manipulate ostracism and inclusion conditions (Williams & 
Jarvis, 2006). In this task, a participant throws and catches a virtual “ball” with two 
online “players.” The participant was also told that two other participants will participate 
in the activity remotely from other universities. In actuality, no remote participants were 
used. Instead, the participant interacted with two cartoons displayed on the computer 





received the ball on approximately 33% of turns (Williams, 2001). In the complete 
ostracism condition, the participant was allowed to throw and catch the ball only once. 
For the remainder of the task, the two cartoons passed the ball between themselves only.  
2.2.4 Pilot Measures 
The following are the measures used in the pilot study investigating responses to 
ostracism.  
2.2.4.1 Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire.  
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) assessed the 
clarity of an individual’s mental picture using a 5-point Likert scale. No responses to this 
questionnaire were used in data analysis. It was included solely to strengthen the cover 
story in this study.  
2.2.4.2 Reflexive and Reflective Questionnaire.  
The Reflexive and Reflective Questionnaire assessed participants’ emotional 
responses (see Appendix A). Participants were asked to complete 4 items assessing 
positive mood (i.e., friendly, pleasant) and 4 items assessing negative mood (i.e., angry, 
sad) for each questionnaire (reflexive and reflective). Each item was rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale (Not at all to Extremely). The reflexive and reflective scales for positive and 
negative affect exhibited acceptable levels of reliability (α ≥ .80).  
2.2.4.3 Ball-Tossing Game Questions 
A series of questions asked participants to report on their experiences in the ball-
tossing game (i.e., “How vividly did you imagine the ball tossing game?”, “Where did 





scale ratings and open-responses. No responses to these questions were used in data 
analysis. It was included solely to strengthen the cover story in this study.  
2.2.4.4 Frequency of virtual interactions.  
Participants were asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale how frequently they 
engaged in different types of virtual reactions. No responses to these questions were used 
in data analysis. It was included solely to strengthen the cover story in this study.  
2.2.5 Pilot Results and Discussion 
The main question for this pilot study was whether ostracism impacts emotional 
experience. Specifically, individuals excluded in the Cyberball task were hypothesized to 
self-report more negative affect and less positive affect than included individuals. A split-
plot ANOVA was conducted to investigate the impact of ostracism condition and survey 
time frame on negative affect. A main effect of ostracism condition was found, F(1, 25) = 
21.57, p < .01, d = 1.28. Across the reflective and reflexive surveys, participants reported 
higher negative affect if they were ostracized (M = 2.10, SE = .13) than if they were 
included (M = 1.28, SE = .12). A main effect was also found for survey time frame, 
F(1,25) = 7.14, p < .05, d = .47. Participants reported higher reflexive negative affect (M 
= 1.88, SE = .11) than reflective (M = 1.50, SE = .115). Finally, a significant interaction 
was found between condition and survey time frame, F(1,25) = 4.32, p < .05. The 
marginal means suggest that ostracized participants consistently reported higher negative 
affect across reflexive and reflective surveys, but their ratings of negative affect 
decreased from reflexive to reflective reactions more than participants in the included 







Figure 2. Negative affective reactions to ostracism. This figure illustrates that excluded 
individuals have more negative affect compared to included individuals and ratings of 




























 Similarly, a split-plot ANOVA was conducted to investigate the impact of 
ostracism condition on positive emotion.  A main effect of ostracism condition on 
positive affect was found, F(1,25) = 19.60, p < .05, d = 1.45. Participants in the exclusion 
condition reported lower positive affect (M = 3.23, SE = .11) than individuals in the 
included condition (M = 3.43, SE = .12). A main effect was not found for survey time 
frame, F(1, 25) = 3.55, p = .07. However, a significant interaction was found between 
condition and time frame, F(1, 25) = 9.69, p < .05. The marginal means suggest that 
ostracized participants self-reported improved positive affect from reflexive to reflective, 
and included participants reported degrading positive affect from reflexive to reflective 
(See Figure 3).  
 These results suggest that ostracism does elicit a strong emotional response, as 
exhibited by changes in negative (ω2partial = 0.46) and positive affect (ω
2
partial = 0.44). The 
interactions also suggest that experienced emotions change rather quickly, and the short 
time frame between the reflexive and reflective questionnaires may be enough for 
participants to begin repairing their mood.  
2.3 Goals and Attentional Pull 
 A second pilot was conducted to assess the effect of goals on attention.  As 
described previously, specific and difficult goals are thought to improve task performance 
compared to “do your best” goals by influencing the effort, persistence, and direction of 
attention towards (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981).   In order to assess attentional 
pull of specific and difficult goals, an attention task susceptible to momentary 







Figure 3. Positive affective reactions to ostracism. This figure illustrates that excluded 
individuals have less positive affect compared to included individuals and ratings of 



























The SART (Robertson et al., 1997) is a simple go/no-go task that involves 
withholding a response on rarely occurring trials (i.e., 1 out of 9 trials). This task has 
been widely used in the mind wandering literature and has been shown to be susceptible 
to changes in momentary attention (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 
2009; Hu, He, & Xu, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & 
Handy, 2008; Smallwood et al., 2004). This task’s ability to capture slight fluctuations in 
attention indicates it should be a good assessment of the off-task attentional pull of 
emotions and the on-task attentional pull of goals.  
 This task is also relatively simple as it solely involves pressing a key in response 
to a frequent stimuli and refraining from pressing a key when a “target” is presented. 
Therefore, specific and challenging goals should not have detrimental effects on 
performance of this task as it does not require high cognitive load. Similarly, the 
simplistic nature of the task should attenuate the relationship between task effort and 
automatic mood regulation. Research indicates that engaging in cognitively demanding 
tasks or high demand expectations may temper negative moods (Erber & Tesser, 1992; 
Gohm, 2003; Kim & Kanfer, 2009). The simplistic nature of the SART should decrease 
the likelihood that task engagement will facilitate automatic mood repair.  
The SART also has the added benefit of being a widely used measure of attention. 
Instead of assessing the influence of goals on performance of a focal task and inferring 
attention, the SART will allow a more direct inference on the influence of goals on 
attention.  
In order to determine if goals pull attention towards a focal task,  a second pilot 





and “do your best” goals and (b) SART performance.  Specific and difficult goals were 
used to test attentional pull, as the effect of these goals compared to “do your best” goals 
has been demonstrated on a variety of performance tasks.   
2.4 Pilot Study of SART and Attentional Pull 
Twenty undergraduate students participated in the study for compensation. 
Participants completed a 20-minute version of the SART and a battery of survey 
questions.  Ten individuals were assigned a specific and difficult goal, while the 
remaining ten individuals received a “do your best” goal.  However, a data recording 
error occurred with one participant on the SART, so his data was discarded leaving a 
sample size of 19 (nine in the “specific and difficult goal condition, ten in the “do your 
best” goal condition).   
2.4.1 Pilot Procedure 
Subjects were asked to complete a 20-minute version of a semantic sustained 
attention task. The task is a go/no-go task in which participants were asked to respond 
with a key-press to all presented stimuli except infrequent (11% all presented stimuli) 
targets. The stimuli were presented in 18-point Courier New font for 300 ms followed by 
a 900-ms mask. The nontarget go trails belonged to one category and the infrequent no-
go trials belonged to another. There were 540 trials with 60 targets. Target accuracy for 
each participant’s performance was reported in real-time in the upper right hand corner of 
the computer screen.    Similarly, non-target accuracy for each participant was reported in 
the upper left hand corner of the computer screen. 
First, a practice block consisting of 20 trials introduced participants to the task 





completing the practice block, participants were introduced to the instructions for the test 
block.  The test blocked used vegetable and animal names for target and non-target trials, 
respectively.  After learning about the task, participants were randomly assigned to the 
specific and difficult goal condition or the “do your best” goal condition.  Participants in 
the specific and difficult goal condition were instructed to aim for 80% accuracy or 
higher on target trials.  This goal was chosen based on the previous performance of 
Georgia Tech students and was approximately 1.5 standard deviations above the previous 
mean.articipants in the “do your best” goal condition were instructed to do their best on 
target trials as well.   
After completing the SART task, participants were given a battery of survey 
questions, debriefed, and compensated.   
2.4.2 Pilot Measures  
The following are the measures used in the pilot study assessing the influence of 
attentional pull on SART performance.  
2.4.2.1 Measure of goal commitment.   
This scale assessed the degree to which participants were committed to the 
experimenter assigned goal (see Appendix B; (Hollenbeck, Klein, O'Leary, & Wright, 
1989).  It consisted of nine items, and participants were asked to indicate the degree to 
which they agreed or disagreed with each item (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”).   
2.4.2.2 Personal Goal for SART 
To assess the effectiveness of the goal-setting manipulation, participants were 





yes, what was your personal goal?” Reponses were compared to their goal setting 
condition.  
2.4.2.3 Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) 
The RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) measures trait-level rumination. 
Tendency to ruminate may enhance the effects of a negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) and has also been shown to account for significant variance in SART 
performance (Roberts et al., 2013). Therefore, the RRS was included as a potential 
covariate. The Ruminative Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) includes 
22 items that describe trait-level responses to depressed mood that are focused on the 
self, symptoms, or possible consequences and causes of the mood (see Appendix C). 
Participants were asked to evaluate the frequency of each statement, ranging from 
“never” to “always” and exhibits acceptable reliability (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). This scale was used as a covariate in the exploratory analyses for the 
SART. 
2.4.2.4 Cognitive Failures Questionnaire – Memory and Attention Lapse (CFQ-MAL) 
The SART has been shown to be susceptible to trait-level cognitive errors. 
Individuals who report more cognitive failures tend to exhibit more errors on the SART. 
The CFQ-MAL has demonstrated that it accounts for significant variance in SART 
performance (McVay & Kane, 2009). Therefore, the CFQ-MAL was included in analyses 
of SART performance as a potential covariate. This scale assesses the frequency of trait-
level minor cognitive failures (see Appendix D; McVay & Kane, 2009). It consists of 40 





demonstrates acceptable reliability (α = .93; McVay & Kane, 2009). This scale was used 
as a covariate in the exploratory analyses for the SART. 
2.4.2.5 SART Performance 
Accuracy on target trials was assessed as a measure of attentional pull on SART 
performance.  
2.4.3 Pilot Results and Discussion 
The main purpose of this pilot was to determine that goals do impact attention.  
As such, an independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if specific and 
difficult goals drew attention to the focal task and improved SART performance 
compared to “do your best” goals.  One participant’s data was discarded as an outlier on 
target accuracy, defined as more than three standard deviations from the mean.  
Discarding this participant’s data seemed especially justified, as the participant 
commented after the task that he spoke English as a second language and did not 
recognize a number of the animals and vegetables presented during the task.  The data for 
the remaining 18 participants was used to assess capability of the SART to capture 
changes in attentional pull.   
A significant effect of goal condition was found on SART target accuracy, t(16) = 
2.63, p < .05), d = 1.28.  Individuals in the specific and difficult goal condition exhibited 
higher SART accuracy (M = .69, SD = .20) than those in the “do your best” goal 
condition (M = .44, SD = .19).  This suggests that the SART task is able to capture 
changes in attentional pull.  Separate linear regression analyses were used to investigate 
the RRS and CFQ-MAL as potential covariates.  An effect was not found for the RRS on 





target accuracy remained significant, β = -.27, t(15) = -2.90, p < .05.  Similarly, an effect 
was not found for the CFQ-MAL on SART target accuracy, β = .10, t(15) = 1.10, p > .05, 
but the effect on condition on SART performance remained significant, β = -.27, t(15) = -
2.82, p < .05.   
 In addition to assessing attentional pull, this pilot study investigated participant’s 
goal commitment to the experimenter assigned goals.  The goal commitment measure 
exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .82).  An independent samples t-test was used to 
determine if goal condition impacted goal commitment.  An effect of condition was not 
found, t(18) = -.28, p > .05, suggesting that goal commitment exhibited similar moderate 
levels for the specific and difficult goal condition (M = 3.18, SD = .79) and the “do your 
best” goal condition (M = 3.26, SD = .39).   
 In summary, it appears that the goals are effective for pulling attention towards a 
focal task, as measured by SART performance.  Therefore, the two pilot studies described 
here were combined for the full study. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
  Despite the conflicting accounts of ostracism and emotional experience, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that an ostracizing experience will elicit a strong 
emotional reaction. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Ostracized individuals will report higher levels of negative affect compared 
to included individuals.  
The results of the ostracism and emotions pilot provide initial support for H1. Ostracized 
individuals do report higher levels of negative affect than included individuals. Of more 





exerts attentional pull through any of the mechanisms explored above, then individuals 
who are depleted of their regulatory resources will be unable to manage the off-task pull 
and subsequent performance on a task requiring sustained attention will be diminished. 
Depletion is a necessary condition to investigate the relationship between emotion and 
attentional pull. If participants have sufficient regulatory capacity, they may be able to 
resist the off-task pull of emotions and not demonstrate a decrease in performance on a 
sustained attention task, thereby obscuring the effect of emotion attentional pull. 
Conversely, depleted individuals may be unable to efficiently ignore the off-task pull of 
emotions, and will therefore exhibit decreased performance on a sustained attention task. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Ostracized individuals will perform worse on a sustained attention task than 
included individuals.  
Characteristics of tasks may also pull attention, and the presence of specific and 
difficult goals may be one such characteristic. Although the effect of goals on attention 
have not been explicitly studied, the core explanatory mechanisms posit that goals 
redirect attention towards the relevant task, resulting in increased performance on that 
task. 
H3: Individuals with specific and difficult goals will perform better on a sustained 
attention task than individuals with a “do your best” goal 
The results of the SART and goals pilot provide initial support for H3.  Individuals with a 
specific and difficult goal exhibit improved performance on the SART compared to 
individuals with a “do your best” goal, suggesting that specific and difficult goals pull 





When emotions and goals are simultaneously activated, the two processes of on- 
and off-task attentional pull may occur concurrently. Specific and difficult goals may 
allow individuals to overcome the off-task attentional pull of emotions by providing a 
safe outlet for individuals to focus their attention. Therefore, an interaction is proposed 
between goal type (specific and difficult vs. “do your best” goal) and emotion condition 
(excluded vs. included).  
H4: The effects of ostracism on attention performance will be moderated by goal 
type, such that specific and difficult goals will exert attentional pull above 
and beyond the effects of ostracism.   
This interaction is the key hypothesis for the study, as it demonstrates the competing pull 











University students were recruited through flyers and word of mouth around the 
Georgia Institute of Technology campus. Participants were randomly assigned to be 
ostracized vs. included and to receive a specific and difficult goal or vague goal (2x2). A 
total of 150 individuals participated in the full study and were compensated $15 each for 
their participation. The data for four participants were discarded (a data recording error 
occurred during the SART for two participants, one participant declined to give her 
informed consent after learning about the true purpose of the study, and one participant 
had completed a previous pilot study), leaving a final sample size of 146 participants.   
3.2 Study Tasks 
3.2.1 Resource Depleting Task  
Prior to the emotion and goals manipulation, all participants were depleted of 
their regulatory resources by completing a difficult and detailed letter task where they 
will be asked to cross out all instances of the letter “e” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  . Participants were handed one page of text from an advanced 
statistical book with the ink lightened so it was difficult to read. Furthermore, they were 
told to cross out all instances of the letter “e” except when it was adjacent to or one letter 
away from a vowel. Completion of this task has been found to require more concentration 
and result in higher levels of fatigue than a similar, yet non-depleting, task (Baumeister et 





been found to be effective.  The directions and stimuli presented in this study is identical 
to the directions and stimuli described in previous research.   
3.2.2 Cyberball Game 
To manipulate ostracism, individuals played the Cyberball game (Williams & 
Jarvis, 2006), which is identical to the task used in the ostracism and emotions pilot.  
3.2.3 Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997)  
To then manipulate goals, participants were instructed to strive for a specific, 
challenging goal or to simply do their best on the SART (Robertson et al., 1997). The 
SART was identical to the task described in the attentional pull and goals pilot study.  
Performance on the SART was used to assess the attentional pull of specific and difficult 
vs. vague goals and emotions. 
3.3 Manipulation Checks 
 To ascertain that the manipulations of emotions and goals worked effectively, 
checks were included.  
3.3.1 Emotional Reaction to Ostracism 
Emotional reactions were assessed using the mood measures contained in the 
Reflective and Reflexive Questionnaire, which was used in the ostracism and emotions 
pilot (see Appendix A; Williams, 2009). The reflexive questions asked participants to 
report on feelings experienced during the game and is administered immediately 
following the conclusion of the Cyberball task.  The reflective questions asked 
participants to report on feelings experienced right now and is administered following the 
conclusion of the SART.  The stems used in the Reflexive and Reflective questionnaires 





type scale (Not at all to Extremely). For the reflexive scale, acceptable levels of reliability 
were found for the negative (α = .92) and positive (α = .93) affect.  Similarly, acceptable 
levels of reliability were found for the reflective scale on negative (α = .87) and positive 
(α = .90) affect.  The high reliability justifies the use of this scale as an indicator of 
participants’ emotional states. 
3.3.2 Measure of Goal Commitment 
This scale, used in the SART and goals pilot,  assessed the degree to which 
participants are committed to the experimenter assigned goal (see Appendix B; 
(Hollenbeck et al., 1989).  It consisted of nine items, and participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with each item (from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”).   
3.3.3 Personal Goal for SART 
To assess the effectiveness of the goal-setting manipulation, participants were 
asked the following: “Did you have a personal goal for the arithmetic task you just 
completed? If yes, what was your personal goal?” Reponses were compared to their goal 
setting condition.  
3.3.4 Believability of Cover Story 
To determine if the cover story was effective, participants were asked the 
following: “Please describe what you believe is the purpose of this study” and “Please 
describe what you believe are our hypotheses.” 
3.4 Measures 
 The (a) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973), (b) ball 





those used in the ostracism and emotions pilot. Similarly, one of these scales will be used 
in the final analyses, but were included solely to bolster the cover story.  The RRS 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and CFQ-MAL (McVay & Kane, 2009) were also 
included, as described in the SART and goals pilot.   
3.4.1 Demographics 
The demographic questions asked participants to report their (a) age, (b) gender, 
(c) ethnicity, and (d) study major. These variables were included as they could potentially 
influence the effectiveness of the ball-tossing task for eliciting emotion.  
3.4.2 SART Performance 
Useful dependent variables from this task are accuracy, reaction times, and signal 
detection sensitivity (dL) and bias (cL; McVay & Kane, 2009).  
3.5 Procedure 
Upon entering the lab, participants were told the cover story identical to the pilot 
study (described above). After participants give their consent, the experimenter asked the 
participant if she could take a photo of him/her to upload to the server so the other 
“participants” could see him/her. If the participant said “yes,” then the experimenter took 
a photo of the participant and downloaded it to a folder on the desktop. If the participant 
said “no,” then the experimenter told the participant they will use a Georgia Tech logo in 
place of his/her picture. A total of four participants opted to use the logo instead of their 
own picture.  The experimenter also ostensibly downloaded the pictures from the two 
“participants” at Emory University and Georgia State University.  
In reality, the participant’s photo was not uploaded to a server. It was downloaded 





conclusion of the session. The photos were not linked to a lab at Emory or Georgia State, 
and no photos were kept past the conclusion of the study. Additionally, no photos of 
other students were downloaded from Emory or Georgia State. Two pictures, found 
online, were used to represent the two “participants” at Emory University and Georgia 
State University.  
While the experimenter was “uploading” and “downloading” pictures, the 
participant was asked to complete the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(Marks, 1973) and the depleting letter task (Muraven et al., 1998).  
After the depletion manipulation, participants began the Cyberball game. As the 
participant read the instructions presented on the computer screen, the experimenter made 
a fake phone call to our partner lab to tell the remote experimenter that we were ready to 
begin. After the participant clicked “Start” to begin the task, a “waiting” page appeared to 
further strengthen the cover story. After that time, the Cyberball task actually began. It is 
important to note that the procedure used regarding the Cyberball task is identical to past 
procedures, including the use of mental visualization as a cover story (Williams & Jarvis, 
2006), a mental visualization scale prior to completing to the task (Wirth & Williams, 
2009), and the fake phone call (Lau, Moulds, & Richardson, 2009).  The only change to 
the protocol compared to past studies is the addition of the “waiting” page prior to the 
beginning of the Cyberball task.  While previous did not explicitly state that a “waiting” 
period was used prior to the beginning of the task, it seems reasonable to assume that a 
similar delay was used to uphold the cover story.  It is difficult to believe that participants 
would believe a cover story involving multiple remote ‘participants’ if they were 





Once the Cyberball game was complete, participants were handed a second 
survey packet. As a manipulation check for emotional response, participants were asked 
to complete the reflexive questions of the Reflexive and Reflective Questionnaire 
(Williams, 2009). In order to maintain the cover story, participants were also asked the 
ball tossing game and frequency of virtual interaction questions.  
Next, the participants were asked to begin the sustained attention task. 
Participants were randomly assigned to goal condition and were told to “Please do your 
best to respond as accurately as possible on the vegetable trials (when you do not hit the 
spacebar)” or “Please try and achieve an accuracy rate of 80% or higher on the vegetable 
trials (when you do not hit the space bar).”  An accuracy rate of 80% was chosen based 
on a previous pilot using the SART.  Accuracy for target trials (when participants refrain 
from pressing the space bar) was displayed in the upper right corner of the screen, and 
accuracy for non-target trials (when participants press the space bar) was displayed in the 
upper left corner of the screen.  After completing the SART, participants were given a 
third and final survey packet. This survey packet collected (a) a measure of goal 
commitment, (b) the Reflective Questionnaire (Williams, 2009), (c) demographic 
information, such as age, gender, and nationality, (d) the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire – Memory and Attention Lapses (McVay & Kane, 2009), (e) the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and (f) asked the 
participants to identify the purpose of our study as a measure of the effectiveness of the 
deception.  
In order to continually remind participants of their ostracizing/including 





Therefore, a reminder of the ball-tossing game was visually present during the entire 










 The results are presented in two sections.  The first section will address the main 
hypotheses.  The second section will address exploratory hypotheses associated with 
potential covariates and emotional responses.  Descriptive statistics for the variables of 
interest are presented in Table 1.   
4.1 Main Hypotheses 
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between emotions and 
inclusion/exclusion.  Two ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of goal and 
ostracism conditions on reflexive (i.e., how did you feel during the game, administered 
after the Cyberball task) negative and positive affect.  A large effect of ostracism 
condition was found on reflexive negative affect, F(1, 142) = 212.10, p < .01, d = 2.40, 
ω2partial = 0.60,  and positive affect, F(1, 142) = 234.96, p < .01, d = 2.54, ω
2
partial = .62.  
Individuals in the ostracized condition experienced higher reflexive negative affect (M = 
3.05, SD = .85) than those in the included condition (M = 1.33, SD = .55; see Figure 4).  
Excluded individuals also experienced lower reflexive positive affect (M = 2.24, SD = 
.68) than individuals in the included condition (M = 3.94, SD = .66; see Figure 5).  A 
main effect of goal condition was not found for reflexive negative affect, F(1, 142) = 






Descriptive statistics for scales and SART performance variables 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Emotion Scales        
Reflexive Negative Affect 146 1.00 4.75 2.19 1.12 0.45 -1.16 
Reflexive Positive Affect 146 1.00 5.00 3.09 1.09 -0.03 -0.92 
Reflective Negative Affect 146 1.00 4.25 2.23 0.93 0.38 -0.92 
Reflective Positive Affect 146 1.00 5.00 2.99 0.85 -0.09 -0.23 
Goal Commitment 146 1.56 4.33 3.08 0.60 -0.43 -0.32 
CFQ-MAL 146 1.55 4.53 2.84 0.50 0.03 0.37 
RRS 146 1.23 3.59 2.22 0.46 0.18 -0.25 
SART Variables        
Target Accuracy 141 0.04 0.96 0.46 0.22 0.07 -0.74 
Non-Target Accuracy 141 0.73 1.00 0.96 0.06 -2.30 4.74 
Target RT 141 203.47 611.16 382.79 85.98 0.50 0.13 
Non-Target RT 141 207.83 661.39 455.64 99.84 -0.29 -0.51 
Signal Detection 
Sensitivity 
141 -0.65 9.57 3.86 2.07 -0.11 -0.51 
Signal Detection Bias 141 0.27 3.99 2.13 0.74 -0.07 -0.24 
Note. Five outliers, defined as observations greater than 3 standard deviations away from the mean, are removed 






Figure 4.  Reflexive negative affective reactions to ostracism and goal conditions.  This 
figure illustrates the main effect of ostracism condition on negative affect.  Individuals 































Figure 5.  Reflexive positive affective reactions to ostracism and goal conditions.  This 
figure demonstrates the main effect of ostracism on positive affect.  Excluded individuals 



























manipulation was not given until after the reflexive survey was completed, this analysis 
served as a manipulation check.  The goal condition groups were affectively equivalent 
prior to the goal manipulation.   Similarly, an interaction between ostracism and goal 
conditions was not found for negative affect, F(1, 142) = .89, p > .05, or positive affect, 
F(1, 142) = 1.70, p > .05.      
Two additional ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of ostracism and 
goal condition on reflective (i.e., how do you feel right now, administered after the 
SART) negative and positive affect.  A main effect of ostracism condition was not found 
for reflective negative affect, F(1, 140) = .01, p > .05, or reflective positive affect, F(1, 
140) = .03, p > .05, suggesting that the effect of ostracism on emotions dissipated.  
Similar to the reflexive scales, a main effect was not found for reflective negative affect, 
F(1, 140) = .93, p > .05, or reflective positive affect, F(1, 140) = .01, p > .05.  As the 
reflective questionnaire occurs after the goal manipulation was administered, these results 
suggest that goal condition did not impact participants’ emotional states.  Finally, an 
interaction between ostracism and goal conditions was not found for reflective negative 
affect, F(1, 140) = .69, p > .05, or reflective positive affect, F(1, 140) = .13, p > .05.  
Figures 6 and 7 depict the marginal means described in these analyses for negative and 
positive affect, respectively.   
 Even though the reflexive and reflective questionnaires have different stems, 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to more explicitly investigate the effects of 
time on emotional states.  As there were no main effects of goals, I collapsed across goal 
conditions.  A split-plot ANOVA was conducted to assess negative emotional reactions 






Figure 6.  Reflective negative affective reactions to ostracism and goal conditions.  A 




























Figure 7.  Reflective positive affective reactions to ostracism and goal conditions.  A 


























inclusion/exclusion, F(1, 142) = 57.17, p < .01.  Across reflexive and reflective 
questionnaires, participants reported higher negative affect when excluded (M = 2.63, SE  
= .08) from the ball tossing game than when included (M = 1.78, SE = .08).  There was 
no main effect of time frame found, suggesting that across exclusion and inclusion 
conditions, participants did not exhibit systematic differences in negative affect across 
time, F(1, 142) = .43, p > .05.  Finally, a significant interaction was found between 
inclusion/exclusion conditions and time frame, F(1, 142) = 111.03,  p < .01.  An 
inspection of the marginal means indicates that on the reflexive questionnaire, indicating 
participants’ emotional responses during the Cyberball task, excluded individuals 
reported higher levels of negative affect (M = 3.03, SE = .08) than those who were 
included (M = 1.33, SE = .08).  However, on the reflective questionnaire, assessing 
participants’ emotional responses “right now” after completing the SART, participants 
exhibited similar, moderate levels of negative effect in the excluded (M = 2.24, SE = .11) 
and included (M = 2.23, SE = .11) conditions (See Figure 8).  This provides partial 
support for Hypothesis 1; ostracism did elicit a negative emotional reaction, but only 
when assessed reflexively.  When assessed reflectively, participants exhibit similar levels 
of negative affect, suggesting that the effect of exclusion/inclusion faded.   
 A second split-plot ANOVA was conducted to assess the role of positive affect in 
response to exclusion.  Similar to the effects of negative affect, a significant main effect 
of inclusion/exclusion was found, F(1, 142) = 67.13, p < .01, indicating that individuals 
who were excluded experienced less positive affect (M = 2.62, SE = .07) than those who 
were included (M = 3.47, SE = .07).  A main effect of time frame was not found, F(1, 






Figure 8.  Negative affective reactions to ostracism.  The figure illustrates that excluded 
individuals have more negative affect than included individuals when asked for reflexive 
reactions.  Excluded and included individuals exhibit similar levels of negative affect 



























across inclusion/exclusion conditions.  A significant interaction was found, F(1, 142) = 
124.18, p < .01.  Similar to the interaction with negative emotion, an inspection of the 
marginal means revealed that on the reflexive questionnaire, excluded individuals 
exhibited lower positive  affect (M = 2.26, SE = .08) than included individuals (M = 3.93, 
SE = .08).  However, on the reflective questionnaire, individuals exhibited similar, 
moderate levels of positive affect in the excluded (M = 2.98, SE = .10) and included (M = 
3.01, SE = .10) conditions (See Figure 9).  This suggests that the influence of 
exclusion/inclusion condition on positive affect attenuated as time increased.   
4.1.2 Hypotheses 2-4 
Prior to assessing the relationship between ostracism and goals on SART 
performance, five participants with outliers on the SART, defined as being more than 3 
standard deviations away from the mean, had their data discarded.  A 2x2 ANOVA was 
conducted on the remaining 141 participants to assess (a) the main effect of emotions on 
SART performance (H2), (b) the main effect of goals on SART performance (H3), and 
the interaction between emotions and goals (H4).  A main effect was not found for 
ostracism on on target accuracy, F(1, 137) = .83, p > .05, target reaction time, F(1, 137) = 
.20, p > .05, signal detection sensitivity, F(1, 137) = .001, p > .05), and signal detection 
bias, F(1, 137) = 3.09, p > .01.  This does not provide support for H2, indicating that 
there is no evidence that ostracism pulled attention away from the SART and negatively 
impact SART performance. A main effect was not found for goals on target accuracy, 
F(1, 137) = .78, p > .05, target reaction time, F(1, 137) = 1.82, p > .05, signal detection 
sensitivity, F(1, 137) = .01, p > .05, and signal detection bias, F(1, 137) = 3.25, p > .05.  






Figure 9.  Positive affective reactions to ostracism.  The figure illustrates that excluded 
individuals have less positive affect than included individuals when asked for reflexive 
reactions.  Excluded and included individuals exhibit similar levels of positive affect 




























and difficult goals pull attention to the SART task and increase performance.  This lack 
of support is troubling, especially given the evidence from the pilot study.  Finally, 
aninteraction between ostracism and goals was not found for target accuracy, F(1, 137) = 
.54, p > .05, target reaction time, F(1, 137) = 1.10, p > .05, signal detection sensitivity, 
F(1, 137) = F = .0002, p > .05), or signal detection bias, F(1, 137) = 1.13, p > .05.  This 
does not provide support for H4, indicating that there is not evidence for an interaction 
between inclusion/exclusion and goals on SART performance.   
4.1.3 Secondary Analyses 
 After testing the main hypotheses, the following exploratory analyses were 
conducted: (a) examining goal commitment as a manipulation check, (b) examining goal 
commitment as a covariate in SART performance, (c) examining the RRS and CFQ as 
covariates in SART performance, (d) a multivariate test of SART performance to explore 
attentional pull effects at different time frames during the task, and (e) correlations 
between emotions and SART performance.   
Goal commitment was assessed as a manipulation check for the participants’ 
acceptance of the experimenter assigned goal.  A measure of internal consistency 
exhibited reliability levels that are slightly below conventional standards (α = .79), 
suggesting that the following analyses involving goal commitment should be interpreted 
with caution.  An independent samples t-test suggests that goal commitment did not 
change based on goal condition (specific and difficult goal vs. a “do your best” goal), 
t(144) = .48, p > .05.  Individuals in the specific and difficult goal condition appear to 
have similar levels of goal commitment (M = 3.12, SD = .62) as individuals in the “do 





of goal commitment as evidenced by the means, suggests that participants were 
reasonably committed to their experimenter assigned goals.   
After ascertaining that participants were reasonably committed to the 
experimenter assigned goals, the relationship between goal commitment and SART 
performance was explored.  Specifically, goal commitment was included as a covariate in 
analyses of SART performance.  A main effect of goal commitment was not found for 
signal detection bias, F(1, 136) = .06, p > .05.  A significant effect of goal commitment 
was found on target accuracy, F(1, 136) = 8.79, p < .01, target reaction, F(1, 136) = 5.07, 
p < .05, and signal detection sensitivity, F(1, 136) = 12.21, p < .01.  However, the 
associated main effects and interactions with ostracism and goal conditions remained 
insignificant for all four dependent variables.  While goal commitment was related to 
SART performance, it did not help explain the effects of the experimental manipulations 
on SART performance.   
The RRS and CFQ were also examined as potential covariates.  The RRS 
measures trait-level rumination. Individuals high in trait-level rumination may exhibit 
stronger negative emotion effects (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  Furthermore, 
previous research has found that the RRS accounts for significance variance in SART 
performance (Roberts et al., 2013). A non-significant effect of the RRS was found on 
target accuracy, F(1, 136) = .37, p > .05, signal detection sensitivity, F(1, 136) =1.36, p > 
.05, and signal detection bias, F(1, 136) =.40, p > .05.  A significant relationship was 
found between RRS and target reaction time, F(1, 136) = 4.02, p < .05, but the associated 
main effects and interactions with exclusion/inclusion and goal condition remained 





The CFQ-MAL captures trait-level cognitive errors and has been shown to 
account for significant variance in SART performance (McVay & Kane, 2009).  
Individuals higher in trait-level cognitive errors tend to exhibit more errors on the SART, 
potentially increasing the noise in our analyses.  Similar to the RRS, a non-significant 
effect of CFQ was found on target accuracy, F(1, 136) =.33, p > .05, target reaction time, 
F(1, 136) =1.60, p > .05, signal detection sensitivity, F(1, 136) =.37, p > .05, and signal 
detection bias, F(1, 136) = .004, p > .05.  This indicates that the RRS and CFQ did not 
account for significant variance in SART performance.   
 After examining the role of potential covariates, SART performance was broken 
down into blocks to determine if an effect of inclusion/exclusion and goals on SART 
performance existed during different time frames of the task.  SART performance was 
broken into five blocks comprised of 135 trials (120 non-target trials, 15 target trials).  A 
MANOVA was conducted across all five blocks.  Similar to the univariate results, the 
multivariate results were non-significant for the main effect of inclusion/exclusion, the 
main effect of goal condition, and the interaction (See Table 2 for relevant F values and 
significance tests).  Attentional pull effects were not found at any of the five time points 
in the SART.   
 Finally, the logic of this study indicates that exclusion will generate a negative 
emotion, and this negative emotion will pull attention away from the focal task.  To better 
assess the relationship between emotions and SART performance, the correlation 
between the two was assessed (see Table 3).  Of note here are the significant correlations 
between reflective negative affect and target accuracy and signal detection sensitivity, 






Multivariate tests of ostracism and goals on SART blocks.   
 Ostracism Condition  Goal Condition  Interaction 
Variable F Value df Sig.  F Value df Sig.  F Value df Sig. 
Target Accuracy .812 (5, 133) n.s.  1.288 (5, 133) n.s.  .589 (5, 133) n.s. 
Target RT 2.417 (5, 122) p < .05*  .714 (5, 122) n.s.  1.682 (5, 122) n.s. 
Signal Detection 
Sensitivity 
.462 (5, 133) n.s.  1.057 (5, 133) n.s.  .670 (5, 133) n.s. 
Signal Detection 
Bias 
1.029 (5, 133) n.s.  .603 (5, 133) n.s.  .361 (5, 133) n.s. 
Note. A main effect for ostracism condition was found for target reaction; however, the subsequent F-tests for each of the 5 








Correlations between emotion and SART performance 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Reflexive Negative Affect -––**        
2. Reflexive Positive Affect -0.86** -––**       
3. Reflective Negative Affect -0.23** -0.17** -––**      
4. Reflective Positive Affect -0.10** -0.22** -0.60** -––**     
5. SART Target Accuracy -0.03** -0.02** -0.22** -0.22** -––**    
6. SART Target Reaction Time -0.16** -0.06** -0.09** -0.03** -0.71** -––**   
7. SART Signal Detection Sensitivity -0.04** -0.00** -0.19** -0.23** -0.74** -0.39** -––**  
8. SART Signal Detection Bias -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** -0.02** -0.41** -0.48** -0.29** -––** 






target trials and exhibited lower sensitivity for distinguishing between target trials and 
noise trials.  Similarly, reflective positive affect was significantly related to target 
accuracy and signal detection sensitivity, such that individuals expressing higher levels of 
positive affect made fewer mistakes on target trials and exhibited increased sensitivity for 
distinguishing between target trials and noise trials. Interestingly, SART performance 
was not related to reflexive emotions.  This suggests that the interactive effect of emotion 
and goals on attention mediated performance.  Participants who performed well reported 
higher positive affect, and participants who performed poorly reported higher negative 










 This study investigated the role of attentional pull (Beal et al., 2005). Specifically, 
it investigated the off-task attentional pull of emotions as induced by an ostracizing 
experience and the on-task attentional pull of specific and challenging goals as assessed 
by performance on the SART.  The results indicated that the emotions as induced by an 
ostracizing experience and experimenter-assigned specific and difficult goals were not 
sufficient to exert attentional pull.   
 When a study reports insignificant results, there are two possible options: (1) the 
proposed theoretical model is incorrect or (2) the study failed to create the necessary 
conditions to provide an adequate test of the hypotheses.  In the following section, I will 
outline each link in my theoretical model and evaluate the conditions under which was 
tested.   
 The primary interest in this study was investigating the off-task attentional pull of 
emotions.  Therefore, the first step in the theoretical model is to ascertain that the 
ostracism manipulation used in this study did elicit an emotional response.  The results 
indicate that ostracism as induced by the Cyberball game did create an emotional 
response.  However, I did not directly assess the intensity or the duration of the emotional 
response.  While a large effect on emotions was found between the ostracized and 
included conditions, it is not clear if ostracized individuals were experiencing intense 
emotions in this study.  However, a previous qualitative study addressed the intense 





and Grahe (2000) discussed emotions in their description of the ‘Scarlet Letter’ project, 
where colleagues purposely ostracized each other for five days.  Their report suggests 
that ostracism led to intense emotional experiences that did reliably pull their attention.  
However, the current study was unable to recreate the immersive experience that 
characterized the ‘Scarlet Letter’ project where individuals were ostracized by known 
colleagues who they saw regularly.  It is possible that the elicited emotion was 
insufficiently intense to pull attention.  However, the large effect size found in this study, 
coupled with the large effects typically found in studies using the Cyberball task 
(Williams & Jarvis, 2006), suggests that ostracized individuals do have very different 
emotional experiences compared to included individuals.  Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that the emotion manipulation was ineffective in eliciting a strong emotional response.  
  A second potential problem is the duration of the emotional response.  While the 
Cyberball task has been reliably shown to produce emotion effects, few studies examine 
the temporal duration of these effects.  Of the studies that do investigate the temporal 
effects of ostracism, they are limited to the “reflexive” and “reflective” distinctions 
addressed earlier and are concerned with finding individual difference moderators 
(Oaten, Williams, Jones, & Zadro, 2008; Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006).  No study 
has explicitly examined the duration of emotional effects induced by ostracism in 
minutes, but Lau et al. (2009) explored the duration of threatened needs in response to 
ostracism.  Specifically, they investigated the role of rumination perspective on the 
persistence of the negative effects of ostracism.  They found that recalling the experience 
from an observer perspective (i.e., as a detached outsider) versus a field perspective (i.e., 





Individuals who recalled their experience from an observer perspective reported higher 
threatened needs 10 minutes after the ostracizing experience, while individuals who 
recalled the event from a field perspective had recovered by that time.  While this study 
did not explicitly investigate the duration of emotions after an ostracizing experience, the 
researchers to provide preliminary evidence suggesting the effects of ostracism via the 
Cyberball task may be relatively short-lived.  This is reflected in the dissipating 
emotional effects observed from the reflexive to reflective time frames.  However, SART 
performance was also analyzed in blocks for precisely this reason.  Even if the elicited 
emotion dissipated, the off-task pull should have been seen in the first or second blocks.  
As the elapsed time between the Cyberball task and beginning the SART was 
purposefully kept to a minimum, it seems unlikely that elicited emotion was too fleeting 
for this study.    
 In summary, ostracism in this study did create an emotional reaction to ostracism.  
While the intensity and duration of that emotion was not directly assessed, previous 
literature and the results of the present study indicate that elicited emotion should have 
been sufficiently intense and persistent for the purposes of this study.   
 The second step in the theoretical model to explore is the off-task attentional pull 
of emotions.  Assuming the Cyberball task did elicit an emotional response, participants’ 
attentional resources should be pulled off-task, resulting in impaired task performance.  
However, the emotions induced by the ostracizing ball tossing game were not sufficient 
to exert attentional pull during the SART.  If we assume that the emotion manipulation 
was successful in eliciting a sufficiently intense and persistent emotion, as arguged 





do not exert attentional pull, or (b) the SART was unable to capture the off-task 
attentional pull.  Prior to passing judgment on the emotion and attentional pull link in the 
theoretical model, I will discuss the goals and attentional pull link to provide a more 
complete picture.   
 The third theoretical link explored in this study was the on-task attentional pull of 
specific and difficult goals.  However, individuals with specific and difficult goals did not 
exhibit higher performance on the SART than individuals with “do your best” goals.  
This finding is especially surprising, as goal setting theory has received robust empirical 
support over the years.  There are three potential explanations for the insignificant results: 
(a) goals do not exert attentional pull, (b) the goal manipulation was ineffective, or (c) the 
SART was unable to capture the on-task attentional pull.  An inspection of the 
participants’ personal goals reveals that many individuals in the specific and difficult goal 
condition revised their experimenter assigned goal of 80% accuracy on target trials down 
to 50 or 60% accuracy, providing preliminary evidence that the goal manipulation may 
have been ineffective.  This downward revision may be due to the difficult nature of the 
task and the cumulative nature of the accuracy goal.  If participants responded incorrectly 
to a number of target trials at the beginning of the task, it becomes very difficult to 
increase accuracy back to the 80% target level.  Individuals in the “do your best” goal 
condition also tended to self-assign specific goals of 50% or 60% accuracy.  In 
exploratory analyses, we ran several models with the contaminated self-assigned goals 
discarded in an attempt to get a purer picture of the role of experimenter-assigned goals 
on SART performance.  Unfortunately, the results were similarly insignificant, 





 A great deal of previous research has investigated the impact of specific and 
difficult goals on performance.  While no study has explicitly tested attentional processes 
and goals, it is a hypothesized mechanism for impacting performance.  Previous research 
has provided compelling support for the efficacy of difficult and specific goals across a 
variety of tasks and samples.  Due to the sheer breadth of this research, it seems highly 
unlikely that goals do not exert attentional pull.  Similarly, the goal manipulation used in 
this study has been successfully used in the past, suggesting that it is unlikely that the 
goal manipulation was unsuccessful.  Therefore, by process of elimination, it appears that 
the SART provided a poor assessment of attentional pull. 
 The individual difference measures provide further evidence that the SART was a 
poor measure of attentional fluctuations.  The CFQ-MAL and RRS were included as 
potential covariates in SART performance, as used in previous studies (McVay & Kane, 
2009; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  However, these individual difference 
measures did not account for any additional variance in this study.  This suggests that 
something about the SART did not work as anticipated.  It is possible that the task itself 
has exerted attentional pull, therefore obscuring the effect of emotions and goals on task 
performance.  However, the task is very dull; target trials are infrequent, the stimuli is 
repetitive, and the task is long.  It does not seem likely that the task itself exerts 
attentional pull, especially as it does not explain the lack of relationship with the 
individual difference measures.    
 A second option is that the SART does not work with a Georgia Tech student 
population.  The task is a relatively simple task; don’t press the space bar when a target 





than average cognitive ability, are able to perform adequately on this task regardless of 
their off-task or on-task attentional pull.  Regardless of the hypothesized reasons for the 
insignificant effects, it appears that the SART was an inappropriate measure of 
attentional pull.   
 Overall, the conditions for testing my hypotheses were imperfect, suggesting that 
the study did not provide an adequate test of the hypotheses.  The potential problems with 
the SART combined with the dissipating emotions suggest that, even if attentional pull 
does exit, this study would be unable to capture attentional fluctuations.  It is possible 
that the hypothesized model is correct, and a more precise study would be able to uncover 
the predicted relationships.  A future study should use a different mesaure of attentional 
pull that can better capture these momentary fluctuations in attention.   
5.1 Conclusion 
 This study was a new endeavor to understand the within-person changes in 
performance as a function of fluctuations in attention. It was hypothesized that emotions 
exert off-task attentional pull and goals exert on-task attentional pull, resulting in 
subsequent changes in task performance.  However, support was not found for the 
attentional pull of emotions or goals.  Future research should further explore on- and off-
task attentional pull using (a) a more persistent emotion manipulation than the Cyberball 













For each question, please circle the number to the 
right that best represents the feelings you were 


















I felt “disconnected”   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt rejected   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt like an outsider   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt I belonged to the group  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel the other players would interact with me a lot  1 2 3 4 5 
 Self esteem 
I felt good about myself  1 2 3 4 5 
My self-esteem was high  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt liked  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt insecure   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt satisfied  1 2 3 4 5 
 Meaningful existence 
I felt invisible   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt meaningless   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt non-existent   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt important  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt useful  1 2 3 4 5 
 Control 
I felt powerful  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt I had control over the course of the game  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt I had the ability to significantly alter events  1 2 3 4 5 
I felt I was unable to influence the action of others   1 2 3 4 5 
I felt the other players decided everything   1 2 3 4 5 
 MOOD 
Good  1 2 3 4 5 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 
Friendly  1 2 3 4 5 
Unfriendly  1 2 3 4 5 
Angry  1 2 3 4 5 
Pleasant  1 2 3 4 5 
Happy  1 2 3 4 5 
Sad  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
For each question, please circle the number to the right 























I feel “disconnected”  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel rejected  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel like an outsider  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I belong to the group 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel the other players interact with me a lot 1 2 3 4 5 
Self esteem 
I feel good about myself 1 2 3 4 5 
My self-esteem is high 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel liked 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel insecure  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 
Meaningful existence 
I feel invisible  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel meaningless  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel non-existent  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel important 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel useful 1 2 3 4 5 
Control 
I feel powerful 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I have control over the course of events 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I had the ability to significantly alter events 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I am unable to influence the action of others  1 2 3 4 5 
I feel others decide everything  1 2 3 4 5 
MOOD 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 
Happy 1 2 3 4 5 













In regard to your experimenter assigned goal, please indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with each statement below.    
Questions Responses 





















3. It is quite likely that this goal may need to be 










4. Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this 




















6. It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon 




















8. I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort 











9. There is not much to be gained by trying to 























People think and do many different things when they feel sad, blue, or depressed. Below 
is a list of possibilities. Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often, or always think or 
do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed by circling the appropriate response.  
Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do.  
 
Question Responses 
1. Think about how alone you feel Never Sometimes Often Always 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t 
snap out of this” 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and 
achiness 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate Never Sometimes Often Always 
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” Never Sometimes Often Always 
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you 
feel 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
7. Analyze recent events to try to understand why 
you are depressed 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel 
anything anymore 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
9. Think “Why can’t I get going?” Never Sometimes Often Always 
10. Think “Why do I always react this way?” Never Sometimes Often Always 
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you 
feel this way 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
12. Write down what you are thinking and analyze 
it 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had 
gone better 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep 
feeling this way” 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
15. Think “Why do I have problems other people 
don’t have” 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” Never Sometimes Often Always 
17. Think about how sad you feel Never Sometimes Often Always 
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, 
faults, mistakes 





19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing 
anything 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
20. Analyze your personality to try to understand 
why you are depressed 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your 
feelings 
Never Sometimes Often Always 







APPENDIX D: COGNITIVE FAILURES QUESTIONNAIRE – MEMORY AND 






This is a questionnaire about minor cognitive failures. You will answer 40 questions that 
try to record how often the different kinds of minor failures happen to you.  
 
The following questions refer to minor failures, which happen to all of us from time to 
time. Some of these failures occur more frequently than others. Please indicate how 
frequently you notice such incidents in your own behavior by specifying how often such 
incidents have happened to you during the last twelve months.  
 
Please mark only one answer per row. 
 




1.  Do you read something and find you haven’t been 
thinking about it, so you have to read it again? 
     
2.  Do you find you forget why you went from one 
part of the house to the other? 
     
3.  Do you find that you forget whether you’ve turned 
off a light or the stove or locked the door? 
     
4.  Do you find it difficult to stay focused on what’s 
happening in the present? 
     
5.  Do you forget where you put something like a 
newspaper, set of keys, or book? 
     
6.  Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing 
you want, and keep what you meant to throw away 
– as in the example of throwing away the 
matchbook and putting the used match in your 
pocket? 
     
7.  Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to 
something? 
     
8.  Do you start doing one thing at home and get 
distracted into doing something else 
(unintentionally)? 
     
9.  At the end of a conversation, do you realize that 
you forget to mention something you wanted to 
say? 
     
10.  Do you have to return to your home or apartment to 
pick up something you forgot?  
     
11.  Do you forget to give a message to somebody as 
you were requested to do? 
     
12.  Do you not notice feelings of physical tension or 
discomfort until they really grab your attention? 
     
13.  Are you unable to find something that you put 
away only a couple of days ago? 
     
14.  Do you drive places on “automatic pilot” and then 
wonder how or why you went there? 





15. Do you forget a person’s name almost as soon as 
you’ve been told it for the first time? 
     
16. Do you forget a change in your daily routine, such 
as a change in the place where something is kept, or 
a change in the time something happens? 
     
17. Do you have to go back to check whether you have 
done something that you meant to do? 
     
18. Do you find your mind wandering when you’re 
doing something that needs your concentration? 
     
19. Do you completely forget to take things with you, 
or leave things behind and have to go back and get 
them? 
     
20. Do you decide to do something and then find 
yourself side-tracked into doing something 
different? 
     
21. Do you start to read something (a book or an article 
in a magazine) without realizing you have read it 
before? 
     
22. Do you completely forget to do things you said you 
would do, and things you planned to do? 
     
23. Do you find you are not sure whether you have told 
someone a particular story or joke already? 
     
24. Does it seem you are “running on automatic” 
without much awareness of what you’re doing? 
     
25. Do you find it hard to keep your mind on a task or 
job? 
     
26. Do you do some routine thing more than once by 
mistake? For example, going to brush your teeth 
when you have just done so? 
     
27. Do you begin to do something and then forget what 
you were supposed to be doing? 
     
28. Do you lose your train of thought in conversation?      
29. Do you have the feeling that you should be doing 
something, either now or later, but you can’t 
remember what? 
     
30. Do you leave some necessary step out of a task? 
For example, forgetting to put tea in the teapot. 
     
31. Do you do jobs or tasks automatically without 
being aware of what you’re doing? 
     
32. Do you think you’re paying attention to something 
when you’re actually not (such as when reading a 
book or having a conversation)? 
     
33. Do you forget to keep appointments that you don’t 
write down? 





34. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road 
that you’re quite familiar with but rarely use? 
     
35. Are you unable to remember something that you 
had been told some time ago? 
     
36. Do you have the ‘what-am-I-here-for” feeling when 
you find you’ve forgotten what you went 
somewhere to do? 
     
 
 
37. Do you do something automatically, or by habit, 
that you really wouldn’t have done if you had 
thought more about it? 
     
38. Do you find yourself not having done something 
you intended after having been interrupted 
unexpectedly? 
     
39. Do you find yourself searching for something that 
you are actually carrying around with you? 
     
40. Do you “lose your place” in the course of carrying 
out some fairly routine activity? 
     
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